The Taylor rule has been the dominant metric for monetary policy evaluation over the past 20 years, and it has become common practice to identify periods where policy either adheres closely to or deviates from the Taylor rule benchmark. The purpose of this paper is to identify (Taylor) rules-based and discretionary eras solely from the data so that knowledge of subsequent economic outcomes cannot influence the choice of the dates. We define Taylor rules-based and discretionary eras by smaller and larger Taylor rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the federal funds rate prescribed by the original Taylor rule, and use tests for multiple structural changes and Markov switching models to identify the eras. Monetary policy in the U.S. is characterized by a Taylor rulesbased (low deviations) era until 1974, a discretionary (high deviations) era from 1974 to about 1985, a rules-based era from about 1985 to 2000, and a discretionary era from 2001 to 2008. The Taylor rule deviations are about three times as large in the discretionary eras than in the rules-based eras and are almost four times larger in the most discretionary era (1974 to 1984) than in the least discretionary era (1985 to 2000). With the Markov switching models, which allow for regime changes at the beginning and end of the sample, we also identify a discretionary era from 1965 to 1968 and a rules-based era in 2006 and 2007. The discretionary and rules-based eras closely correspond to periods where the Taylor rule deviations are above and below two percent. * We are grateful to seminar participants at Emory University for helpful comments and discussions. The data used in the paper can be downloaded at
Introduction
Comparison of rules-based and discretionary monetary policy has been central to macroeconomics since the publication of the seminal Kydland and Prescott (1977) article. While there are a great variety of policy rules, the Taylor (1993) beyond) as the ad hoc era. He argues that economic performance in the rules-based period was vastly superior to that in the ad hoc period and, while correlation does not prove causation, the timing of events supports the interpretation that (good or bad) policy causes (good or bad) economic performance rather than causation going in the opposite direction.
Identification of monetary policy eras is fraught with peril. Whatever the rule, there is always the danger that, since the economic performance outcomes are known, periods with good economic performance will be identified as rules-based while periods of bad economic performance will be characterized as ad hoc.
In this paper, we propose and implement a statistical methodology for dividing monetary policy into Taylor-rules-based and discretionary eras. We first calculate Taylor rule deviations, the difference between the federal funds rate and the interest rate implied by the Taylor (1993) rule, 1.0 plus 1.5 times inflation plus 0.5 times the output gap, which assumes that the target inflation rate and the equilibrium real interest rate both equal 2.0 percent. Next, using tests for structural change and Markov switching methods, we identify Taylor rules-based eras where the deviations are small and discretionary eras where the deviations are large. With both methods, neither the number nor the dates of the regimes is specified a priori, and so prior knowledge of economic outcomes cannot affect the results.
Calculating Taylor rule deviations necessitates some choices and compromises. We want to use real-time data that was available to policymakers when interest rate decisions were made for as long a period as possible. While it would be ideal to use internal Fed (Greenbook) output gaps, these are only available from 1987 to 2007. We therefore use real-time real GDP (or GNP) and GDP (or GNP) deflator data from the Philadelphia Fed starting in 1965:Q4, when the data begins, and ending in 2008:Q4, when the Federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound. We calculate inflation as the percentage change in the GDP deflator and the output gap as the deviation from a real-time quadratic trend. We show that the real-time quadratic detrended output gaps provide a closer approximation to "reasonable" real-time output gaps, calculated using Okun's Law, than alternatives including real-time linear and Hodrick-Prescott detrending.
We identify monetary policy eras with Bai and Perron (1998) Perron and Qu (2006) , which restrict the mean of the deviations in the two rules-based and two discretionary eras to be the same, are used instead. During the discretionary periods of the 1970s and 2000s, the Federal funds rate is consistently below the rate implied by the Taylor rule while, in the early 1980s, the actual rate is above the implied Taylor rule rate. The size of the deviations in the discretionary eras is more than three times as large as in the rules-based eras.
We also use the Markov switching methods of Hamilton (1989) , where the monetary policy eras are defined by high and low Taylor rule deviation states. Most of the regime dates are close to those found with tests for structural change. The first Taylor rules-based (low deviations) era ends in 1974:Q3, followed by a discretionary (high deviations) era from 1974:Q4 1 The discretionary and rules-based eras closely correspond to periods where the Taylor rule deviations are above and below two percent.
As with the tests for structural change, the size of the deviations is more than three times as large in the discretionary eras than in the rules-based eras.
It is important to be clear regarding what this paper is and is not about. We are not providing new evidence that monetary policy rules work better than discretion, a topic that has been the subject of extensive research. Instead, we use two well-known econometric methodologies, structural change tests and Markov switching models, to identify Taylor rulesbased and discretionary eras from the data instead of choosing the eras a priori. Since our classification of rules-based and discretionary eras is not influenced by economic outcomes, it provides an improved basis for dating rules-based and discretionary eras and, therefore, for evaluating the effects of monetary policy rules versus discretion.
Taylor Rule Deviations with Real-Time Data
Taylor (1993) proposed the following monetary policy rule,
where t i is the target level of the short-term nominal interest rate, t π is the inflation rate, π is the target level of inflation, t y is the output gap, the percent deviation of actual real GDP from an estimate of its potential level, and R is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate. Taylor postulated that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank's reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were both equal to 2 percent, producing the following equation,
We define Taylor rule deviations as the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the interest rate target implied by the Taylor rule with the above coefficients. A rules-based era would have small deviations while a discretionary era would have large deviations. In our empirical work below, "large" and "small" are determined endogenously in the context of our statistical methods.
The implied Taylor rule interest rate is calculated from data on inflation and the output gap. Following Orphanides (2001) , the vast majority of research on the Taylor rule uses real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest rate setting decisions were made. The three leading methods of detrending are linear, quadratic, and Hodrick-Prescott (HP).
Real-time output gaps using these methods are depicted in Figure 1 . In contrast with output gaps constructed using revised data, where the trends are estimated for the entire sample, there is no necessity for the positive output gaps to equal the negative output gaps. While there are considerable differences among the gaps, the most negative output gaps correspond closely with NBER recession dates for all three methods.
Which real-time output gap best approximates the perceptions of policymakers over this period? We use Okun's Law, which states that the output gap equals a (negative) coefficient times the difference between current unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment, to construct "rule-of-thumb" output gaps based on real-time unemployment rates, perceptions of the natural rate of unemployment, and perceptions of the Okun's Law coefficient. We focus on the quarters of peak unemployment associated with various recessions, and investigate the congruence between real-time Okun's Law output gaps and real-time output gaps computed with various detrending methods.
2 The lag reflects the fact that GDP data for a given quarter is not known until after the end of the quarter.
The peak unemployment rates associated with the two recessions of the 1970s were 6.0% Okun's Law output gap is for 1972:Q1, (assuming a one-quarter lag before the GDP data was released), is -2.4%. This is close to the output gaps constructed by real-time linear and quadratic detrending, -2.2% and -2.9%, respectively, but higher than the real-time HP filtered gap of 0.0%. 
Structural Change
In order to identify monetary policy eras, we use Perron (1998, 2003) tests for multiple structural breaks, allowing for changes in the mean of the Taylor rule deviation. We consider the following multiple linear regressions with m structural breaks (m+1 regimes):
where d t are the Taylor rule deviations from Equation (2) Bai and Perron (2003b) .
4
Using the above test we find three significant breaks in the mean of the Taylor rule deviation and, therefore, four regimes. The results are reported in Table 1 and illustrated in One question that naturally arises is whether the breaks define distinct regimes. In order to answer this question, we report confidence intervals around the break dates in Table 1 . The 95 percent confidence intervals are all smaller than three years and do not overlap, providing additional support for our characterization of low and high deviations eras.
While the Bai and Perron tests identify statistically significant changes in the mean of the Taylor rule deviations, they do not determine whether the means for the two higher deviations periods are statistically different from the means in the two lower deviations periods. In order to assess whether the mean of the deviations in the two rules-based and the two discretionary eras are significantly different we use the Perron and Qu (2006) restricted structural change test. We 4 Bai and Perron (2003a) use an efficient algorithm for estimating the break points based on dynamic programming techniques. They also propose a methodology for identifying breaks if the no-break null is not rejected against the single-break methodology, which is not needed for this paper. 5 We also estimated break points where the Taylor rule deviations were calculated using an output gap coefficient of 1.0 instead of 0.5, which is consistent with the specification in Rudebusch (2010). The major difference was that the first discretionary era starts in 1978:Q4 instead of 1974:Q3. This does not accord with the inflationary experience of the 1970s. By imposing these constraints, we restrict the mean of the deviations in the two rulesbased eras to be the same (µ 1 = µ 3 ) and the two discretionary eras to be the same (µ 2 = µ 4 ). In order to test for the existence of structural change, we use the supremum F-test of no structural change (m = 0) against an alternative of m = three restricted structural changes. The estimates of the restricted break dates are constructed as the global minimizers of the restricted SSR using the method of Bai and Perron (2003b) . As previously, we use a value of the trimming parameter ߝ = 0.15. Asymptotic critical values are simulated. 6 The results are reported in Table 2 The differences between the rules-based and discretionary eras are economically as well as statistically significant. The Taylor rule deviations are almost three times larger in the discretionary eras than in the rules-based eras using Perron and Qu tests and are almost four times larger in the most discretionary era (1974 to 1984) than in the least discretionary era (1985 to 2000) using Bai and Perron tests.
It is often asserted that, because monetary policymaking is forward looking, Taylor rules should be estimated using forecasted instead of realized variables. We investigate the implications for our results by estimating Bai and Perron models with four-quarter-ahead Greenbook inflation forecasts, which are available from 1973:Q3 -2007:Q4, complemented by 6 A code written in the Gauss language is available from Perron and Qu (2006) . 7 Because the break dates in Table 2 are identical to those in Table 1 , they are also depicted by 
Markov Switching
We proceed to apply the Markov Switching (MS) model of Hamilton (1989) µ 2 , we say that in regime 1 the Fed was running a rules-based monetary policy, while in regime 2 the policy was discretionary. Thus the model postulates that:
where the unobserved state variable (s t ) is governed by the following transition probabilities:
Large values of p ss generate inertia, resulting in persistent monetary policy regimes. The parameter vector θ = {µ 1 , µ 2 , σ 1 , σ 2 , and p 11 , p 22 } can be estimated by maximum likelihood using the procedure described in Hamilton (1989) . The results are available in Table 4 with the state distribution presented in Figure 5 .
The algorithm identifies two separate persistent regimes with the estimated probabilities p 11 =0.96 and p 22 =0.95. As with the tests for structural change, the results are economically as well as statistically significant. The size of the deviations is more than three times as large in the discretionary eras (µ 2 =2.92) than in the rules-based eras (µ 1 =0.81), with the difference between the regimes being highly significant. 9 If we look at the estimated state distribution, most of the regime dates are close to those found with tests for structural change. The first Taylor Table 5 with the state distribution depicted in Figure 6 . Although the correspondence is not exact, the results are broadly consistent with those of the model where both the mean and variance of the Taylor rule deviations are allowed to switch between states, and it is clear that the results from that model are not driven solely by changes in the variance.
The second additional version of the Markov switching model allows both the mean and the variance of the Taylor rule deviations to switch between states, but does not constrain the dates of the mean and variance switches to be the same. The results are reported in Table 6 with the state distribution for the mean and variance illustrated in Figure 7 . The state distribution for the mean is broadly consistent with the state distributions of the model where both the mean and variance of the Taylor rule deviations are allowed to switch between states and the model where only the mean is allowed to switch, although the correspondence is again not exact. The state distribution for the variance, in contrast, is very different than any of the state distributions for the mean. It is clear that the division between Taylor rule-based and discretionary eras is driven by changes in the mean, not the variance, of the Taylor rule deviations.
Historical Perspective on our Statistical Results
Using narrative methods, Taylor 
Conclusions
The superiority of rules versus discretion has been a recurring theme for the conduct of monetary policy for over 30 years. During the past 20 years, the most common metric for monetary policy evaluation has been the Taylor rule where, in its original form, the prescribed federal funds interest rate is equal to 1.0 plus 1.5 times the inflation rate plus 0.5 times the output gap. Periods in which the federal funds rate adhered relatively closely to the Taylor rule prescribed rate, notably the mid-1980s and the 1990s, are often associated with good economic outcomes while periods in which the federal funds rate was further removed from the Taylor rule prescribed rate, notably the 1970s and (more controversially) the early-to-mid 2000s, are often associated with bad economic outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to identify (Taylor) rules-based and discretionary eras from the data rather than choosing them a priori. Choosing the dates of the eras endogenously is important because, if they are picked exogenously, there is always the possibility that knowledge of subsequent economic outcomes will influence the choice of the dates. We define Taylor rulesbased and discretionary eras by smaller and larger Taylor rule deviations, the absolute value of the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the federal funds rate prescribed by the original Taylor rule, and use tests for multiple structural changes and Markov switching models to identify the eras. 
